The price formation mechanism in an asset market with boundedly rational agents can be viewed as a filter acting on incoming news about economic fundamentals as dividends. Here we study the properties of an asset pricing market filter obtained under some simple behavioral assumptions, and examine the resulting dynamical structure of the fluctuations of the market price around the time-varying underlying fundamental reference price. The starting point is an asset pricing model in which agents can choose among two different degrees of information on fundamentals. At the same time agents are also learning the parameter of the dividend generating process. This leads to prices that deviate substantially and persistently from the fundamental value in the short run but stay close to it in the long run. In particular, prices have a time varying mean reverting dynamics which we show to be related to agents' interaction triggered by informational differences.
Introduction
Since the beginning of the eighties, the validity of the efficient market hypothesis has been questioned on the basis of empirical evaluation of, so called, financial anomalies. Well-known examples are excess volatility, as argued by Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) , reversion of the asset prices to its mean, as documented by Poterba and Summers (1988) and Fama and French (1988b) , and correlation between returns and lagged returns or lagged dividend yields, as shown in Shiller (1984) and Fama and French (1988a) .
Stimulated by these findings, a part of the scientific community has investigated whether such anomalies can be explained by assuming that the agents operating in the market are boundedly rational. Although the exact implication of bounded rationality on the action of the agents in the market varies among the different models, a common characteristic is that boundedly rational agents behave "as if" they are perfectly rational in certain limits. In this literature, agents' are often assumed to be able to optimize an objective function under certain constraints but unable to optimally anticipate the effect of their and other agents' actions. In particular it is not assumed that agents use rational expectations, that is, given their belief system agents are not able to coordinate their actions such that their beliefs are self fulfilling. Models with boundedly rational agents do not question that rational behavior, and especially rational expectations, can be a good approximation to the equilibrium of agent's repeated interaction. They argue that the convergence to such an equilibrium is worth investigating as it might explain part of the economic variables' fluctuations we observe in reality.
Among the models that assume that agents are boundedly rational, one class concentrates on the interaction of agents choosing different expectations schemes in order to explain fluctuations in prices that are not due to fluctuations in economic fundamentals. In a study of a stylized financial market, Brock and Hommes (1998) assume that agents do not know whether it is more profitable to use a strategy that predicts prices by relying on fundamental information, or a strategy that predicts prices by extrapolating trends. Agents use realized profits or similar performance measures to decide which strategy to use. The result of this choice for the best strategy, or best predictor, leads to complex endogenous price fluctuations. Since such endogenous fluctuations can already arise in the absence of exogenous influences such as time-varying fundamentals, explicit exogenous noise sources are often avoided, for instance by assuming constant fundamentals and reformulating the price dynamics in terms of deviations from the fundamental value. An advantage of this assumption is that the price dynamics can be specified in terms of (often nonlinear) difference or differential equations that can be analyzed analytically.
A limitation of models in this class is that they typically ignore the effect of news about the economic fundamentals on agents' behavior thus excluding one of the most trivial behavioral scenarios one might deem important in asset price formation -the over-or under-reaction of agents, and hence the market, to new information. Generally speaking, market models that tend to a stable equilibrium state in the absence of news may still show relevant endogenous fluctuations triggered by the arrival of new information. Because a priori we cannot conclude that economically relevant endogenous fluctuations are necessarily self-perpetuating as in chaotic dynamics, we explicitly wish to examine the role of exogenous noise on the price dynamics, thus keeping open the possibility of scenarios where endogenous fluctuations require repeated triggering by an ongoing sequence of exogenous shocks.
In view of this critique, there is another class of models in the literature of asset markets with boundedly rational agents, which explicitly takes into account the role of news on fundamentals on the price dynamics. Early examples are Bulkley and Tonks (1989) and Barsky and De Long (1993) who investigate the effect of agents' learning of the growth rate of dividends from movements in the stock price. More recent examples are Timmermann (1993) , Timmermann (1996) and Barucci et al. (2004) , who assume that agents estimate the parameters that define the relationship between prices and dividends. In all cases agents use the rational expectation relationship that would hold between endogenous variables (prices) and exogenous variables (dividends) if the underlying parameters were known. That is, agents do not take into account that their learning effort is modifying the way dividends feed back into prices. As a result, new information about dividends influences returns not only directly but also indirectly as it modifies the estimates of the parameters that the agents use to forecast future prices and/or future dividends. These models converge to rational expectations when the agents learn the data generating process parameters. A limitation of such models is that they all assume the presence of a representative agent, so that neither informational differences nor different expectations can play a role. Moreover due to the stochastic components attached to the incoming news about the fundamentals, results are always obtained by means of simulations.
Motivated by these arguments, the main aim of this paper is to construct a framework for examining a market with boundedly rational agents where both parameter estimation and interaction of different expectation structures are present. Our objective is to characterize how both effects transform incoming information into realized market prices. Because it is impossible to carry out this exercise under all conceivable behavioral assumptions, we limit ourselves to a simple class of agent models, where all agents act upon the information available to them regarding fundamentals (including that revealed by prices). Different expectations can be explained by different degrees of information regarding the future value of dividends. This means that agents neither extrapolate price trends or use other chartists' rules per se, nor expect other agents to do so, so that second -or higher-order expectations play no role. We investigate the extent to which such a minimalistic model is able to explain empirical properties of asset prices. As it turns out, the agent-based dynamics driven by exogenous noise leads to a simple econometric model for prices that can account for several well-documented anomalies such as return autocorrelation and large persistent deviations of the market price from the fundamental price in the short run but convergence to it in the long run. In fact, in line with the econometric model proposed by Summers (1986) , our model leads to a (log) price which is the sum of a permanent component, proportional to the (log) dividend, and of a transitory component, related the (log) dividend yield, which in our case is shown to follow a stationary AR(1) process. Interestingly, such a process has a time varying linear coefficient whose fixed part depends on the memory agents use to estimate the parameters of the model and whose time varying part depends on the fraction of informed agents. This offers theoretical support to the empirical evidence that the temporary component in mean reversion is nonlinear and switching between regimes with different rates of convergence, as documented both in Gallagher and Taylor (2001) and in Manzan (2003) .
As we consider an asset market where agents have different degrees of information, our framework is closely related to that of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) (henceforth GS). They in-vestigate whether the price is informationally efficient in a repeated market for a one period living asset where agents can decide between two different degrees of information about the value of the asset return at the end of the period. As GS, we also assume that agents operating in the asset market can decide whether or not to be informed about the next period's dividend value. Contrary to GS, as in the papers that followed theirs, such as Bray (1982) , Hellwig (1982) or Routledge (1999) , we consider a dynamic model rather then a static. By this we mean that we do not start off by assuming that agents have rational expectations but rather see rational expectations as a possible convergence outcome of a learning process of boundedly rational agents which are using simpler rules. Failure of the uninformed agents to learn the relationship between prices and dividends implies deviations of the price from its fundamental value. Moreover, we do not assume that the fractions of informed and uninformed agents are at equilibrium but assume that each fraction is determined by the comparison of past performances of both strategies. The fraction of each type of agents is thus an endogenously determined variable. Another difference is that we model a market for an infinitely living asset rather than of a sequence of identical markets for a one period living asset. This implies that agents need to form expectations not only on the future values of the dividend but also on the remaining value of the asset. To our knowledge, Goldbaum (2005) is the first to consider such a multi-period market, but, while he assumes the dividend to be stationary in differences, we assume, in order to compare with real data, that it is stationary log-differences. Accordingly, we show that our agents' demand can be derived from mean variance maximization of a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function. Apart from the fact that a CRRA framework is a more plausible assumption in a world of geometrically increasing fundamentals, it also allows to model the evolution of fractions of informed and uninformed agents as the evolution of their relative wealth or market power. This leads to a replicator dynamics type of equation as the mechanism responsible for the updating of market fractions, with advantage that this mechanism arises "naturally" and need not be postulated.
Our model also shows that financial markets populated by agents with different degrees of information are economic systems with negative feedback. This establishes a precise correspondence with the famous cobweb model, as in Ezekiel (1938) and with the literature that originated from it, such as Muth (1961) and Brock and Hommes (1997) . Our master equation for the evolution of the price dividend ratio as a function of agents' expectations has a perfect correspondence with the equilibrium price equation in a cobweb model in the case of linear supply and linear demand. We refer to this literature to justify the expectation formation of boundedly rational agents. In particular Brock and Hommes (1997) show that if rational expectations comes at a cost, boundedly rational agents keep switching between a sophisticated and a simple expectation scheme thus generating complicated price fluctuations. We do not model such expectation choice explicitly in this paper because we want to keep our model as simple as possible. An analysis in this direction is performed by De Fontnouvelle (2000) who showed that if agents are allowed to switch among different types of expectations schemes and if rational expectations come at a cost, an asset market of the type proposed by GS leads to similar price fluctuations as Brock and Hommes (1997) found for the cob-web model. Even if De Fontnouvelle considered the simpler case of a one period living asset, by endogenizing the choice of expectations he arrived at a rather complicated model that he analyzed mostly by means of simulation, rather than also analytically as we do here.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model in terms of its three founding elements: the asset market (2.1), the expectation dynamics (2.2) and the evolution of the fractions of informed and uninformed agents (2.3). Section 3 analyzes the co-evolution of the market price and of the fractions of informed and uninformed agents in a world without uncertainty about future growth rates of dividends. Technically in this section we analyze the deterministic skeleton of the system of difference equations developed in Section 2 and summarized in Subsection 2.4. Section 4 analyzes the full model, i.e. the evolution of the market price and of fractions of agents when uncertainty about future growth rates of dividends plays a role. There we compare the results of our model with other contributions in the literature and check if it can reproduce wellknow financial anomalies. Section 5 concludes and sets targets for future research. All proofs are in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 contains the micro-foundation of the price equilibrium equation used in Subsection 2.1.
The model

The asset market
We consider a market where shares of a financial asset are traded repeatedly. At each period of time the market is populated agents who believe that the discounted sum of expected future dividends constitutes a "fair" price. As in GS, every agent can decide whether or not to be informed about the value of next period's dividend. As a result, at every period the population of agents is divided in two groups with different degrees of information concerning fundamental variables. The current setting differs from GS in that the asset in our model represents a claim on an infinite sequence of future dividends rather than a single dividend. This implies that assets have a remaining value after each dividend payment, and that agents, besides forming expectations on dividends, should also form expectations on future asset price developments. Another important difference with respect to the GS framework is that in our model agents are boundedly rational. As a consequence agents are not able to compute the equilibrium relationship between price and dividends that should arise in the market where informed and uninformed agents operate. The aim of this Section is to characterize how, in this setting, the market price of an asset/share, p t , and the fraction of informed agents, λ t , co-evolve given the agents' expectations and the dividend process {d t }. In order to arrive at such a relationship we first specify the underlying assumptions of our model.
Assumption (i)
The dividend process, {d t }, is stochastic. In the benchmark case {d t } is given by a geometric random walk. At time t, d t , is given by:
where {η t } is a sequence of independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables with mean 1 and variance σ 2 η . This implies that the constant (1 + g) is the long run growth rate of dividends.
Assumption (ii) Agents know that the dividend is growing over time at a certain rate which they assume to be rather constant in the long run. Furthermore, if we let g e t,t+i denote their time t belief, or estimate, of the growth rate of dividends at time t + i, i > 0, g e t,t+i , we assume that agents use g e t,t+1 = g e t,t+1+i for all i > 0 and that this belief is homogeneous across agents. In general the belief is a function of random shocks that can be correlated with past dividends shocks {η t , η t−1 , . . . } and/or with past prices shocks {p t − p t−1 , p t−1 − p t−2 , . . . }. When we want to keep the model in a simple deterministic form we assume that the estimate agents use is a constant that is g e t,t+i = g e for all t and i ≥ 1.
Assumption (iii) All agents are "fundamentalists" in the sense that following the present value model, they assume that the discounted sum of all future dividends is a "fair" value of the asset. The exact relationship between today's price and tomorrow's expected dividend depends on the agent's information about future dividends. We denote the fair value at time t by v t that is, the expected discounted sum of future dividends, conditional on the information set at time t
The coefficient (1 + r) is the required return rate. Both the fact that agents use the same discount rate for all future periods and that the discount rate is the same across agents are assumptions that we take because we want to concentrate on other sources of deviations of the price from the fundamental. The discount rate can be characterized as the sum of the risk free rate and of the risk premium, which depends upon the risk preferences of agents. In this case, to state that agents use the same discount rate means that agents have the same risk preferences. See Appendix 1 for a derivation of the risk premium in a context where preferences of the agents are explicitly taken into account. In order to avoid "rational bubbles", we also assume that the discount rate is always bigger than the agent's estimate of the growth rate of dividends.
Assumption (iv)
At each period of time t each agent can decide whether to be informed or not about the value of d t+1 . As a result, at every period there are two groups of agents having a different degree of information regarding the next realization of the dividend process. At time t, the informed agents are fully informed regarding d t+1 . This implies that their current expectation of the t + 1 dividend, d
e,I
t,t+1 , is equal to d t+1 . We assume that for this information they pay a cost c per time step. The uninformed agents do not know d t+1 but can only use public information, available in the form of realized dividends d s and realized prices p s , s ≤ t, to form their expectations, d
e,U t,t+1 , about d t+1 . For example, if they would rely solely on the public belief of the dividend growth rate, they could use d e,U t,t+1 = (1 + g e )d t . The alternative which we consider here, is that they try to get additional information revealed by the demands of informed agents through the current market price p t . Uninformed agents, according to the present value model, consider a general relationship between the dividend and the price of the type:
Given this notation, uninformed agents are trying to estimate the price dividend ratio y from past prices and dividends. In general their estimate, at time t, of y for period t + 1, y e t,t+1 , depends upon {d t /p t−1 , d t−1 /p t−2 }. We discuss this in more detail in Subsection 2.2. We let λ denote the fraction of informed agents, so that 1 − λ is the fraction of uninformed agents. A subscript t is added when we consider a time dependent λ. This will be the case when λ t is endogenously determined. We postpone this to Subsection 2.3.
Assumption (v)
At each time t, the ex-dividend market price p t of one share is given by the following market equilibrium equation:
where the superscripts I and U refer to the "fair" value of the asset conditional on the information of the informed and uninformed respectively. Although this market equilibrium equation is admittedly stylized, it can be derived by assuming that agents can choose to invest in a risky asset and in a risk free bond and use a mean variance utility to decide how much of their wealth to allocate in each investment. If one starts from such a micro-foundation of agents' demands, assumption (v) translates into the assumption that markets clear as in a Walrasian framework. For a clarification of this point see Appendix 1. Notice that under this assumption the realized price today is a weighted average, with weights being equal to the fraction of each agent type, of the agent's estimate of the share's fair value.
Given assumptions (i) − (v) the next step is to derive their implication on the evolution of the price. First, for the purpose of using it in equation (3), we compute the fair value for the informed and for the uninformed agent, respectively.
Informed agents Assumption (ii) implies that informed agents have a certain belief about the nature of the dividend process and at time t they use g e t,t+1+i = g e t,t+1 for all i > 0. Assumption (iii) implies that expectations of future share values are directly linked to expected future dividends through equation (1). Assumption (iv) implies that at time t the informed agents know the value of d t+1 . Hence their expectation for the future dividend is simply:
Plugging these expectations into (1) we arrive at the informed agents' estimate of the value of a stock,
Equation (5) implies that the informed agents are behaving similar to those called fundamentalists in the interacting agents literature (e.g. Brock and Hommes, 1998) . In fact, their fair value of the asset is proportional to the dividend payed at time t + 1. Because of this we shall refer to v I as to the fundamental price p * .
Uninformed agents
We have assumed in (iv) that boundedly rational uninformed agents try to infer the value of d t+1 from the clearing price p t . In doing that, they use their model, eq. (2), to establish a relationship between the current realized market price p t and expected future dividends d t+1 . Combining this with assumptions (ii) and (iii) as we did for the informed agents we obtain d
which using (1) gives the uninformed agents present value,
Notice that also for uninformed agents, we have a correspondence with the literature on interacting agents. In fact, our ("fundamentalists") uninformed agents are behaving "as if" they are chartists, that is, they use current prices to estimate the value they attach to the asset. This being an important characteristic of our model, we anticipate its consequences here. Imagine y e and g e as constant. If y e /(r − g e ) is bigger then one, uninformed agents behave as "if" they are trend followers, and they drive prices well above the fundamental levels such that the realized price dividend ratio is lower that (r − g e ).
The converse happens when y e /(r − g e ) < 1. In this case uninformed agents behave "as if" they are contrarian. In our case, y e and g e are time varying and related to past values of dividends and prices. As a result, the uniformed agents behave "as if" they are chartists but with changing trend coefficient as new fundamental and market information comes available.
Given the expectations of both types of agents, specified in equations (5) and (7), and the market equilibrium equation (3) we get,
. This equation shows that the realized price is proportional to the fundamental price -the same result one gets through the Gordon model -but that there is an additional behavioral factor due to the presence of the uninformed agents trying to extract information from the market price. In fact, one can interpret this as a generalization of the Gordon equation to a simple setting where agents have different degrees of information.
The previous equation can be written as a relationship between the realized ratio y t+1 = d t+1 /p t and the ratio y e t,t+1 predicted by the uninformed agents:
or, in terms of deviations from its fixed point,
Equation (8) is the equilibrium equation that will be used throughout the paper. Given g e t+1 and r t , it establishes a relationship between the uninformed agent's estimate of the dividend price ratio and its realization. For any λ ∈ (0, 1], and neglecting for the moment the effect of the updating of g e on the dynamics of prices, the unique rational expectations equilibrium is the fixed point of eq. (8), y * = r − g e . When y = y * the market price equals the fundamental price p * . This gives approximately the same price process as derived by Timmermann (1993) or by Barsky and De Long (1993) who consider a model where agents are updating their estimate of g. The novelty here is that boundedly rational agents need not converge to the RE equilibrium for y. As a result, the fact that y fails to converge to y * , i.e. that the price is informationally inefficient, gives a source of deviations of the price from its fundamental value, which is independent from the fact that agents are estimating of g. Technically, the fact that the linear coefficient of (8) is negative has important consequences for the structure of our model. When the system is out of equilibrium, the presence of uninformed agents generates a price that differs from the fundamental price in the opposite direction of what the uninformed agents expected. Deviations of y t+1 from r − g e have the opposite sign of deviations of y e t+1 from r − g e . This implies that the uninformed agents enforce a negative feedback structure between their expectations and realizations of the dividend price ratio. This observation links our model to the classical cobweb model (see e.g. Ezekiel (1938) for an early treatment). In fact equation (8) for the price dividend ratio is the same as the equilibrium price equation in a cobweb model with linear supply and linear demand.
Expectation dynamics
In order to make the dynamics for the dividend yield as a function of its lagged values and of dividends innovation explicit we have to specify how agents form expectations of the long run growth rate of dividends g and of the dividend yield itself. As far as the growth rate of dividends is concerned, we follow Barsky and De Long (1993) and assume that agents use adaptive expectations to estimate its long run value. Adaptive expectations are characterized by
where we refer to γ as the memory coefficient since specifying the rate at which agents discount past information. Notice that naive expectations are obtained in the special case γ = 0 and that g e t,t+1 is the mean of all past observations of y when γ = (t − 1)/t. When γ is constant Muth (1960) has shown that adaptive expectations are optimal when the data generating process has both a temporary and a persistent component. This means that if our agents has in mind this as a data generating process for the growth rate of dividends, then he would derive adaptive expectations starting from g e t,t+1 = E t (g t+1 ) where E t is the mathematical expectation given the information at time t. This is the approach considered by Barsky and De Long (1993) . One can derive that if the agent believes that the effect of the persistent component is very small then he uses a high γ. These expectations are thus not consistent with the process we assumed for the dividend, where the growth rate of dividends has only a temporary component, but the inconsistency is rather small when γ is high.
The same expectation technology is assumed for the estimation of the value of the future dividend yield. In this case it is the literature on the cobweb model that leads as to this choice. Muth (1961) used the cobweb model to show that the only expectations that do not lead to arbitrage opportunities are rational expectations. It is easy to argue that the same would happen here if rational expectations came at no cost. But if rational expectations come at a cost, Brock and Hommes (1997) have shown that when agents are given the possibility to switch between rational expectations and simpler expectations at no cost, they do so so that convergence to rational expectations is not observed. This is also the result obtained by De Fontnouvelle (2000) who also analyzed a financial market inspired by the GS framework. In his case agents can choose both an information level and an expectations structure. He obtains non-convergence to rational expectations but, even if he considers the more stylized case where the asset is living only one period, the resulting system of equations is too complicated to analyze in full detail analytically. When rational expectations come at a cost, although it would be interesting to allow for a choice of expectation strategy also in our framework, this would considerably complicate the analysis. In order to keep the structural form of our model at its simplest level we assume here that boundedly rational agents use adaptive expectations and obtain rational expectations as the equilibrium point of the feedback structure. Adaptive expectations are widely used in these models and empirical support in favor of present values models has been shown by Chow (1989) . Furthermore, adaptive expectations give a reasonable trade-off between simplicity of use and implementation, and consistency with the outcomes of the models.
Adaptive expectations for the dividend yield are specified by:
Where the parameter α ∈ [0, 1] is, as γ, the memory parameter that specifies the rate at which agents discount past information. Substituting these expectations into equation (8) one obtains the following dynamics:
which using (8) again, and assuming g e t,t+1 = g e can be rewritten in a simple form in terms of y t+1
The steady state corresponds to the rational expectations value y * = r − g e . The stability condition is given by:
That is, adaptive expectations may fail to converge to rational expectations if the fraction of informed agents, λ, is too low. We anticipate here that, when the fraction λ is time varying, and when g e and r are time dependent, the dynamics of y t+1 obtained from (8) and (11) is:
When these estimates contain random disturbances, e.g. when the estimates are a function of past realized of dividends, Eq. (11) characterizes an AR(1) process for the dividend price ratio. Notice that the AR(1) coefficient goes to 1 as α → 1, so that {y t } is close to a random walk, while it enforces a strong negative autocorrelation structure as α → 0.
Evolution of fraction of informed agents
The use of boundedly rational expectations in a negative feedback framework has important consequences when one endogenizes the dynamics of the fraction of informed agents λ. As one might expect, uninformed agents are driven out of the market when the cost of being informed is zero and no other sources of shocks are present. The reason being that their action influences the dividend price ratio in a direction which is opposite to the expectations underlying their action. In other words they act against themselves. This is why, as argued by Muth, rational expectations agents should profit from this situation. On the other hand when such a cost is positive, if agents had rational expectations the price would fully reveal the available information about future dividends and, the cost of being informed being positive, nobody would pay for it. This implies that the fraction of informed agents would go to zero so that the price wouldn't contain information about the dividend anymore. This is the same puzzling result found by GS. In their case, in order to derive what they call the equilibrium degree of disequilibrium, where rational informed and uninformed agents coexist and the price fails to reveal all the information of the informed agents, GS assume that both the signal received by informed agents and the supply of share are noisy. By assuming that agents have boundedly rational expectations we offer another source for balancing the cost for information and the informational content of the price namely the learning process of the uninformed agents. Goldbaum (2005) offers a similar interpretation of the failure of the price, to fully reveal information in a financial market. Before we arrive at this result we have to endogenize the fraction of informed agents λ. Then in Section 3 we show how the equilibrium degree of disequilibrium arises in our framework.
Assumption (vi)
The evolution of the fraction of informed agents λ is modeled by the replicator dynamics mechanism. The replicator dynamics can be motivated in the context of boundedly rational agents who are learning and imitating which strategy to play in a strategic environment (see eg. Binmore and Samuelson, 1997) . In this context the replicator dynamics arises naturally in a framework where the equilibrium Eq. (3) is derived from the maximization of a mean variance utility function. In this case, as outlined in Appendix 1, λ is the fraction of the total wealth possessed by the informed agents. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider other specifications of the dynamics of λ, we believe the result to be valid more generally than just for the replicator discussed here. Since the objective of the agents is to gather information about future dividends, we assume that the success of a strategy is related to the forecast error of the dividend predictor. Informed agents have zero forecast error. Uninformed agents try to forecast the future dividend by estimating the ratios y t+1 , so that their squared forecast error for the realization y t is (y e t − y t ) 2 . The costs of the implementation are, respectively, c > 0 per time step for the informed agents and 0 for the uninformed. As a result we can define the fitness π t of the strategies at time t. The informed agents have:
while the fitness of being uninformed is
The factor (r − g) 2 in the denominator is not essential and introduced merely for convenience. Notice that in the presence of a time varying fraction λ t , Eq. (8) becomes:
Using this relation between y t+1 and y e t,t+1 we can rewrite the fitness of the uninformed agents (14) as:
where y * = r − g e t,t+1 defined as usual.
Assumption (vi) is replaced by the assumption that the wealth of the agents evolves proportionally to expressions (13) and (14) if one takes the maximization of a mean variance utility function as a starting point (Appendix 1). Given the fitness measure of both strategies we can now specify the dynamics for λ. Under replicator dynamics the fraction λ t of informed agents evolves according to
where the parameter ρ defines the speed of the adjustment and δ can be interpreted as a mutation or experimentation parameter. The parameter δ is related to what we call evolutionary (or selection) pressure in this way: as δ → 0 the updating of the fractions is determined more and more by the selection mechanism, on the other hand when δ = 1 the evolutionary pressure reaches its minimum and the fractions are both 1/2 independently on the fitness of the two strategies. In terms of the expressions (13) and (15) the replicator dynamics (16) gives,
Market returns
To summarize, the full model developed so far is given by the following four equations
y e t,t+1 = αy
The equations are related, in order, to expectation formation regarding the growth rate of dividends, to the market equilibrium condition, to the expectation formation of the dividend yield, and to the dynamics of the fraction of informed agents. From the system (18), in particular from the dynamics of the dividend price ratio and from the dividend process {d t }, one can derive the asset price return. In fact, since
Equation (19) shows that we have a model whose realized price, even when log dividends follow a random walk, is the sum of a permanent and a temporary component. A similar equation was first suggested as an econometric model that describe the behavior of stock prices in Summers (1986) . In our case the permanent component is given by the log dividend while the temporary component is given by the dividend yield that follows a stationary autoregressive process. Notice that when the fraction of informed agents, λ, is time varying, the autoregressive coefficient of the equation for y is time varying too. This is consistent with the empirical evidence that the temporary component follows a non linear process, see for example Gallagher and Taylor (2001) and Manzan (2003) . Now, if we call ρ t , the log price return at time t, the previous equation gives:
In Eq. (19), whenever y t converges to its steady state value, that is whenever y e t+1 converges to the rational expectations value r − g e t+1 , the price follows the fundamental that takes into account the fact that discount rates and growth rate estimates are changing. The same price level considered by Barsky and De Long (1993) . If, moreover, g e t,t+1 → g, the fundamental price converges to the "correct" present value price implied by the data generating process, so that p * t (r − g)/d t+1 → 1. If y t fails to converge to r − g, deviations of price from the present value or no arbitrage price can have two sources. One source is the failure of the system specified in (18) to converge to its fixed point, or the fact that the adaptive expectations do not converge to rational expectations. This source is related to the work of GS and to the fact that prices are not fully informative. The other source is that, even if the system does converge, it could approach a another equilibrium where g e = g. This is a situation where the fundamental price p * is not equal to the no arbitrage price. This is specifically relevant when the estimate g e is time varying so that the system in (18) is stochastic and it is related to the work of Barsky and De Long (1993) . We analyze both effects separately and their interplay in what follows. First, in Section 3, we analyze the conditions of convergence of the deterministic system dynamics of y and λ to their equilibrium values. Then, in Section 4, we complement this analysis by investigating the effect of a time varying stochastic g e and how the two sources interact.
Informational differences
In this section we analyze the impact of informational differences alone on the dynamics of asset prices. Technically, we analyze the deterministic skeleton of system (18) and interpret the results and relate them to the work of GS. Throughout this section we assume g e to be constant. Without loss of generality we also assume g e = g. In other words, we concentrate on deviations of the price from the fundamental that are due to informational differences rather then on the estimation of the long run growth rate of dividend. As a matter of notation, throughout the rest of the paper whe use y e t+1 ≡ y e t,t+1 , that is, when in the estimate of one variable only one subscript is present, this points to the period for which the forecast is made with the implicit assumption that the forecast is taken one period before.
First notice that, since the second equation in (18) describes a one-to-one relation between expected and realized dividend-price ratios, the dynamics can be expressed in terms of the two variables y e t and λ t−1 :
Before investigating the full dynamics it is instructive to start the analysis by considering the onedimensional system one obtains when the fraction λ t of informed agents is fixed to a constant value λ.
Dynamical system
Taking λ t fixed to λ, the first equation of (20), together with (8) leads to (11). Given the linearity of this equation, the analysis of the dynamics is straightforward. In this special case it is possible to compute the general solution of the difference equation. That is, given y 0 one can compute the value of y t , ∀t. The following proposition, the proof of which can be found in App. 2, summarizes the results.
Proposition 1 Given the parameters (α, λ) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1), and r > g (i) Solution. The solution of the difference equation (11) with initial condition y 0 is given by:
where
. Stability. If λ > 1 2 y t converges to its equilibrium value of y * , otherwise y t diverges to ±∞.
Notice that in all cases where the system converges to its steady state the price fully reveals the information concerning the future dividend. The shaded area in Figure 1 shows the stability region. The shaded area is divided in two different regions with different gray scales. In the lighter one, the linear coefficient is negative, whereas in the darker, the linear coefficient is positive. In particular the border between the stability and the instability region is characterized by a negative linear coefficient. This implies that failures of the price to fully reveal the fundamental information should be characterized by price fluctuations with negative autocorrelation. This statement is made more precise in the analysis of the two dimensional (2-D) model that follows.
The dynamics in the more general case with λ t time dependent is nonlinear. We use local stability analysis to characterize the behavior of the state variables (y e t , λ t ) close to the fixed points.
Proposition 2 Take α ∈ (0, 1), δ ∈ (0, 1), k = ρ/c > 1 and r > g. 
The fixed point is stable if and only if
. which corresponds to the stability condition of the 1-D dynamical system, namely
(iii) Primary bifurcation. When the selection pressure increases, β = 1/δ > 1/δ, the system undergoes a flip bifurcation. The local stability conditions in terms of the parameters (α, δ) are given in the right panel of Fig. 1 for k = ρ/c = 10. In the white area the system is unstable, while in the shaded area the system is stable. In case of stability the system converges to a fully informative price. This result is not contradicting those obtained by Grossman and Stiglitz, which is that markets cannot be informationally efficient. In fact it has been obtained by distorting the dynamics of the fraction of informed agents, i.e. by assuming a big enough rate of mutation δ. Under this condition there is always a fraction of agents that are prepared to buy fundamental information. If, on the other hand, δ = 0, the system is always unstable. In general, for every α ∈ (0, 1), prices are not revealing information and the system is unstable for sufficiently small mutation rates. The definition ofδ in Prop. 2 shows that for the stability region of the system is decreasing with respect to the cost of information c and increases with respect to the speed of adjustment ρ.
What happens to the dynamics of the system when the stability line is crossed? In order to answer this question we analyze the global dynamics of the system for δ <δ. In the instability region, while in the 1-D system the ratio y diverges unboundedly and unrealistically, in the 2-D system our simulations show the emergence of bounded aperiodic cycles (see Fig. 2 ). It can be shown (but this is beyond the scope of this paper) that such fluctuations are associated with a so called homoclinic bifurcation (see also Fig. 3 ). Such phenomena can be encountered in multidimensional nonlinear systems and emerge from the interplay between local instability and global stability. Brock and Hommes (1997) and Droste et al. (2002) present other economic frameworks where homoclinic bifurcation arise. They also offer detailed discussions of the mathematical aspects behind these interesting phenomena.
Before turning to the economic interpretation of such fluctuations and to the comparison of our results with those of GS, it is instructive to characterize the convergence of the fraction of informed agents in the stability region. One can see that in the short run, close to the equilibrium λ changes very slowly.
Proposition 3 Given α ∈ (0, 1), δ ∈ (0, 1) and k > 1 if we call ν 2 = J| (y * ,λ * ) (2, 2) we have
The previous proposition shows that when δ is small and k big, the value fo ν 2 is very close to one so that when the system is stable, changes in the value of the fraction of informed agents λ are very slow and hence λ is very persistent. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) consider an asset pricing model where agents can either buy information on fundamentals or try to extract such information from the asset price. In a repeated single period model with rational agents, they show that there cannot exist an equilibrium value of the fraction of informed agents for which the price fully reveals the information about the future dividend. Our model is inspired by theirs but with two important differences: (1) our agents are not rational but boundedly rational, that is, they do not use rational but adaptive expectations, and (2) we consider a multi period model where future returns are determined by capital gains in addition to dividends, so that agents must form expectations about both future prices and dividends.
Economic interpretation
In the instability region, our numerical investigation of the dynamics of the price dividend ratio and of the fraction of informed agents, suggests that when the experimentation level, δ, is zero our result is in line with that of Grossman and Stiglitz: there exists an equilibrium degree of disequilibrium where informed and uninformed agents coexist. In our case the equilibrium degree of disequilibrium is time varying since the system adjusts itself to a pattern of a-periodic oscillations where the prices are not fully informative. The economic intuition of how this happens is quite clear. If the fraction of informed agents is high enough, we are in a region where the adaptive expectations of boundedly rational uninformed agents converge to rational expectations and the price is close being fully informative. This pushes down the fraction of informed agents. As a result, being too few agents informed, the system is in a position where uninformative boundedly rational agents using adaptive expectations do not converge to rational expectations and the price starts to diverge from its fundamental value. This creates incentives to buy information and pushes the fraction of informed agents up again. And so on and so forth. Technically, this trade-off between local instability (when to few agents are informed) and global stability (when many agents are informed) is linked to the presence of a homoclinic tangency for the 2-D system of difference equations. Fluctuations of prices and fractions are illustrated in Fig. 2 , which shows time series of y t and λ t , for a small mutation rate δ (high selection pressure). Bursts of endogenous oscillations of y e t (and thus y t ) are produced whenever the fraction of informed agents λ t is in the instability range (λ t < (1 − α)/2). These a-periodic fluctuations constitutes what we call time-varying equilibrium degree of disequilibrium.
We stress that the origin of the equilibrium degree of disequilibrium is very different from that in GS's paper. There two key assumptions are needed to obtain such results: (1) the supply of shocks is noisy (this is equivalent to saying that there are noisy traders in the market) and (2) the informational content of the dividend signal is not perfect. Without these two assumptions, an equilibrium degree of disequilibrium would not exists. This is not the case here, where the equilibrium degree of disequilibrium originates from the fact that agents are bounded rational and their expectations do not always converge to rational expectations. Intuitively, adding noise traders and biases about information of dividends in our model does not change our result.
Before we continue we ask ourselves if the tension between informed and uninformed agents alone is able to account for some of the properties of the asset prices we observe in reality. The answer is certainly not; price returns generated by this model have substantial negative first order autocorrelation. This is due to the negative first order autocorrelation in y t , which is characteristic for the unstable region (see also Fig. 2 ). Because this is not what one observes in financial returns series, additional sources of asset price fluctuations are missing. This is due to our simplifying assumption to fix the estimate of g (and the required discount rate) to a constant. We analyze the coupled influence of informational differences and the estimation of the long run g in the next section.
Informational differences and parameter learning
In the previous section we have assumed that the agents' estimate of the dividend growth rate is constant. As a result, the equation for the dividend price ratio is fully deterministic. In this section we analyze both impact of informational differences and of assuming that agents update their estimate of the long run growth rate of dividends as new information about the fundamentals comes available. As a result we have to deal with a stochastic system. A similar analysis in a context where there is no informational differences among agents has been performed by Barsky and De Long (1993) and Timmermann (1993) , among others. In particular Barsky and De Long (1993) assume that agents use adaptive expectations to estimate g. Recalling the results from Section 2, adaptive expectations are specified by Eq. (9) which, when the dividend follows a geometric random walk with innovations (1 + g)η gives:
The previous equation, together with the evolution of the dividend yield, its expectations, and the fraction of informed agents lead to Eq. (18).
In what follows we present the qualitatively effect of such shocks on our system. We do that in two stages, first by analyzing the impact of a single shock η, and then by analyzing the cumulative impact of a sequence of shocks {η}. In both cases we present results not only for the dividend yield and price generated by our model, but also the dividend yields and prices generated by two important benchmarks that can be seen as restrictions of our model. The first benchmark is the classical asset pricing model, that assumes that all agents know the long run dividend growth rate g and all agents are informed about d t+1 . In this case the dividend yield is constant and given by:
The second benchmark is the dynamics for the dividend yield obtained by Barsky and De Long (1993) . They consider agents without informational differences who have to form expectations about the long run growth rate g. In their case the dividend yield is given by:
where g e t+1 is given by adaptive expectations as in Eq. (21). Notice that, for a given g e t+1 , the dividend yield y * t+1 corresponds to the fixed point of the deterministic skeleton of our model, as investigated in Section 3, that is to the point were price are fully informative. Using the last equation together with (21) we can derive:
This last equation specifies an AR(1) equation for the dividend yield. The memory parameter γ is related both to the AR(1) coefficient and to the variance of the innovations,
η . The mean of the process is instead independent from the memory parameter and equal to r − g.
As a way to illustrate the effect of dividend shocks on the dynamics of (18) and to compare it to y * * and to the dynamics of y * , fix the value of λ and recall from equation (12) in Section 2 that
This equation suggests that also in our case the dividend yield follows an AR(1) process with shocks that are correlated with the shocks of the growth rate of dividends. When γ = α, that is, when agents use the same memory to estimate the growth rate of dividend an the dividend yield, Eq. (24) have a simple appealing formulation:
If we define
we can rewrite the previous equation as
The result is that, when γ = α, our model specified by Eq. (26) and the model of Barsky and De Long (1993) specified by Eq. (23) differs only for the value of the memory parameter γ. Since γ is the real memory agents use to discount new information, we can refer to γ as the effective memory. Definition (25) shows that the effective memory has two components, one being given by the real memory and the other being an effect that the action of uninformed agents enforces a negative feedback on the evolution of y. This second effect is less and less important as more and more informed agents are present in the market. The general result is that γ (λ) is an increasing function with γ (λ) ≤ γ for all λ, and γ (1) = γ. That is, the presence of uninformed agents creates an effective memory which is lower then the real memory agents use. The value of γ determines both the AR(1) coefficients and the variance of the shocks but not the long run mean which is always r − g. The lower the effective memory, the higher the impact of the shocks on the dynamics of the dividend yield and the faster the reversion of the process to its mean. Also, since the effective memory γ is a function of λ, our model allows for variation of the memory parameter as the fraction of informed agents λ varies. Changes in λ have an impact on γ and thus on the variance of shocks and on the speed of convergence. In what follows we explore the importance of both the effective memory being lower than the real memory and the effective memory being time varying on the dynamics of the dividend yield compared to its two benchmarks.
Nonlinear mean reversion
An important characteristic of our model is that it leads to two benchmarks under certain limits. From the previous subsection it is clear that the three models specified by (22), (23) and (24, 26) are one nested into the other. First notice that the long run mean of both y and y * is given by y * * . That is both our model and the one of Barsky and De Long (1993) replicate the results of the classical Gordon model in the lon run. Also, the dynamics of y and of y * might not be practically distinguishable. In fact, when the fraction of informed agents is fixed, the two models coincide when one consider an effective memory parameter instead of the real memory. As a result, if we do not have another condition to characterize the value of the memory parameter, it can be impossible to distinguish one from the other. Our model differs clearly from that of Barsky and De Long (1993) when the faction of informed agents evolves endogenously, or, more generally, is time varying. In this case system (18) implies an AR(1) for the dividend yield where both the rate of convergence of the dividend yield to its mean and the variance of shocks are time varying. This consideration links our model to the econometric analysis of nonlinear mean reversion that has recently been proposed to explain to characterize the fluctuations of stock indexes. Recall Eq. (19) from Subsection 2.4. Now define p * * t ≡ d t+1 /(r − g), i.e. the price implied by model (22), and x t = y t+1 /(r − g). Equation (19) becomes:
When x t is close to its long run average of 1 one can rewrite the previous expression expanding the logarithm around one. Using the variable z t = 1 − x t one gets
where, according to Eq. (26),
This equation shows that we have a model whose realized price is the sum of a permanent component log(p * * t ), which follows a random walk with drift, and of a temporary component, since z t follows a stationary autoregressive process. Both Gallagher and Taylor (2001) and Manzan (2003) reject the null hypothesis that the temporary component in a mean reversion model as (27) follows a stationary process with fixed parameters. In particular Gallagher and Taylor (2001) show that quarterly data of the logarithm of the dividend yield of the index SP500 are well fitted by an ESTAR (Exponentially Smooth Transition AR) ARCH 1 model whose two regimes have AR(1) coefficients equal to 0.72 and −0.52 respectively. As the learning literature has suggested that the fact that the dividend yield follows an autoregressive process might be related to the agents' learning of the model parameters, our model suggests that changing "learning" coefficients and heteroskedasticity can be related to agent interaction. Notice in particular that a regime with a negative AR(1) coefficient can be explained only in terms of the effective memory γ since the real memory is always bounded between zero and one.
Although we find this analogy rather striking, it is not our purpose here to calibrate our model to reproduce the stock prices evolution given the historical dividend process. Our theoretical model is based on several simplifying assumptions and in particular on an ad hoc dynamics of the fraction of informed agents λ. Nevertheless we find it instructive to note that the nonlinearity in a mean reversion model can be related to what in general we may refer to as agents' interaction, which in, our case, is triggered by informational differences. That agent interaction can be responsible for nonlinearity in the behavior of stock prices is also argued by Boswijk et al. (2005) , they estimate a model inspired by Brock and Hommes (1998) using yearly data of the index SP500. Further efforts to characterize the effect of informational differences, for example to link it to other observable characteristics as the volume of transactions, might offer insight to the design of new econometric tests for the evolution of stock prices.
Simulated data
Next we illustrate the price dynamics resulting from our complete model (λ time varying) in the case of an artificially generated dividend process. We consider dividends generated according to Assumption (i) , that is, d t+1 = d t (1 + g)η t+1 , where {η} are i.i.d. log normal shocks with mean zero and variance σ η . It is instructive to start the analysis by comparing the effect of a single shock on y and y * and thus, through Eq. (27), on the realized price that are respectively the market price p and the fundamental price p * . Fig. 4 shows that in both cases we observe overreaction and convergence to the equilibrium value which is given by p * * ; the price implied by the classical asset pricing model. For an effective memory γ lower than the real memory γ, the variance of the shocks is larger in our model, so that the overreaction is more pronounced. At the same time the value of the autoregressive coefficient is closer to zero so that convergence is faster. The overall effect is that the shock has a higher short run impact but a shorter half life for p than for p * . In the same figure the right panel shows the response of γ to changes in λ. From the Jacobian of the 2-D system (see Proposition 2 in Section 2) we know that changes in y have second order effects on λ, as a result changes in λ are negligible in the short run. But, from Proposition 3 of the same section, we also know that the eigenvalue η 2 is close to one so that changes in λ are very persistent. Both results are confirmed by the changes in γ shown in the right panel. Notice that even if these changes are very small, the fact that they are very persistent might lead to large deviations when a sequence of shocks is considered. A confirmation of the fact that one shock has no considerable consequence on changes of γ comes from the third line of the left panel where the evolution of p * is shown for γ = γ (λ 0 ) where λ 0 is the value of the fraction of informed agents before the shock. We call this last line p * γ . The overall comparison of the dynamics of p, p * and p * γ shows that in the single shock case the fact that the effective memory is lower than the real memory has a higher impact then the fact that the effective memory is time varying. Notice also that with informed agents being present in the market, the price anticipates the shock on the dividend, that is the price takes into account the change in the dividend before such a change is realized and much before such change has an effect on the value of the effective memory.
We turn now to showing the effect of a sequence of shocks. Figure 5 shows the impact of a sequence of 500 i.i.d. shocks {η}. The long run growth rate of dividends, g, and the variance of the growth rate shocks, σ 2 η , are taken in accordance with historical quarterly data of the index S&P500. The discount rate r is taken such that y * * = 0.05, that is the price implied by the present value model is 20 times the value of the dividend. If we think of quarters, 500 dividends correspond to 125 years. In the top row the left panel shows the dynamics of y whereas the right panel shows the dynamics of y * . In both cases the horizontal line is the long run mean y * * = r − g. The same results as for a single shocks emerge: the dynamics of the dividend yield is less persistent in our model and deviations from the y * * are larger. The bottom row offers a comparison of the same systems in terms of log prices. How important is the fact that the effective memory is time varying? The right panel of Fig. 6 shows the changes in the effective memory. These changes are due to changes in the fraction of informed agents λ via the transformation equation (25) . As a confirmation of previous results and of our theoretical analysis, changes in γ (that is changes in λ) are rather persistent. The left panel of the same figure shows deviations of log prices generated by our model and log prices generated by y * with memory equal to the mean of the effective memory,γ . We call this last series y * γ . Notice that deviations are up to more than ten percent. Our conclusion is that when subsequent shocks are present both the effective memory being lower than the real memory and the effective memory being time varying play an important role. Naturally, these properties are dependent on the choice of updating mechanism for λ t and of the fitness measures as presented in Subsection 2.3. We do not claim the mechanism we propose here is more realistic than others to characterize the changes in the fraction of informed agents. We merely offer a qualitative argument to support that informational differences can explain the nonlinearity in the mean reversion that has been shown to exist in the empirical literature.
Another way of comparing the various model is to check for correlation in the time series of returns produced by the evolution of y * * , y * and y. For this purpose we perform a variance ratio test to evaluate the statistical importance of departure of the models from a random walk with drift. The variance ratio is used to appraise the mean reversion properties of a stock index by Poterba and Summers (1988) . Under the null hypothesis that log prices follows a random walk (possibly with drift) the variance is a linear function of the return time span. Results of this test for our model, its restrictions and for historical data are given in Figure 7 . Also the variance ratio tests are consistent with our claim that both the effective memory being lower then the real memory and the effective memory being time varying are significant effects. y ) = 0.00355) and refers to the total return generated by the model in system (18). The three lines refer to data generated with our model, y, to the model of equation (23), y * , and to the model of equation (23) with memory γ =γ . Parameters are the same as for Fig. 5 . The test has been performed using a generated price series of 200, 000 periods. Right panel: variance ratio test with historical data, the dotted line show the one standard deviation bounds of the test.
Conclusion
In this paper we have build up a simple model of an asset market where agents are boundedly rational and have different degrees of information regarding future dividends. As far as the theoretical guidelines behind our model are concerned we show that our model naturally and parsimoniously extends and links many other contributions in this fields. In particular, we refer to those that concentrate on informational differences, as Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , those that analyze the impact of learning, as Barsky and De Long (1993) , and those that investigate the interaction of agents who are using different predictor schemes or different strategies , such as Brock and Hommes (1998) . Another characteristic of our model is that it can be easily modified to meet different assumptions regarding, e.g., the dividend process, or the expectation scheme without changes in the main results. A first result is the theoretical relevance presented in Section 3. There we extend GS's results and show that a price equilibrium degree of disequilibrium can be achieved in a multi-period market populated by with boundedly rational agents. A second result is given in Section 4 where we show that informational differences in a market with boundedly rational agents also have interesting empirical implications. Our framework provides insights into a well-known econometric model that was introduced to justify financial anomalies such as mean reversion and return predictability and that assumes that the stock price is the sum of a permanent and of a temporary component. In our case, the permanent component is directly linked to the dividend process whereas the temporary component is related to agents' learning of the dividend growth rate and to the agents' attempt to extract information from prices. In particular this second effect shows how a time varying coefficient of the temporary component, and thus a nonlinear mean reversion, can be explained. this assumption is that here our focus is to characterize how fluctuations around the fundamental prices might arise and try to characterize them rather then to answer the question of how is the return of stocks related to the preferences of agents and to other parameters as the risk free rate. In order to derive the asset return, r t , endogenously as a function of the exogenous parameters r f , σ 2 , γ, s t and of the discount rate r, one should solve the equilibrium price equation given agents' demands without fixing s t p t /w t to θ. Notice also that the presence of noisy agents in the system, or equivalently of a noisy supply of shockss, translates in a noisy proportion of wealth invested in the risky assetθ and as a consequence of our equilibrium restriction, in a noisyr. This is the approach that we follow in Section 4.
The micro-foundation of the price equilibrium equation (3) offers an appealing interpretation of λ t as the fraction of wealth of the informed agents, and a natural way to endogenize its evolution. In fact the wealth fraction at time t + 1 is endogenously determined as a function of the fraction at time t, the demands at time t and the return of the market at time t + 1. When the realized one-period return of the asset r t is higher than r f if the informed agents invests a higher (lower) share of their wealth compared to the share of uninformed agents, their fraction of wealth increases (decreases) compared to the fraction of wealth of the uninformed agents. By explicitly keeping track of the evolution of the wealth of the informed and uninformed agents one can easily derive the equation that governs the evolution of λ is
where π I t (π U t ) is the realized profit per unit of wealth of the informed (uninformed) agents. Equation (28) corresponds to the replicator dynamics equation given in equation (16) of Subsection 2.3. To obtain (17) one has to assume assume that realized profits per unit of wealth can be rescaled to be proportional to the expressions (13) and (14) for respectively the informed or the uninformed agent. This corresponds to the assumption that the realized profit for unit of wealth is inversely proportional to the cost of information for the informed agents and inversely proportional to the ability to predict y for the uninformed agents.
Appendix 2: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 Given the linear difference equation
and the initial condition y 0 , from the theory of linear systems follows that y t = (y 0 − (r − g)) α + λ − 1 λ t + (r − g).
is the unique solution.
Proof of Proposition 2
The second order equation cλ 2 + (cδ/2 − c − δρ)λ + δρ/2 = 0, has two roots. Take α ∈ (0, 1), δ ∈ (0, 1) and k = ρ/c > 1. From:
2 − δ + 2kδ − 1 > 0, it follows that 2 − δ + 2kδ + (2 − δ + 2kδ) 2 − 8kδ 4 > 1.
In the same way 0 < 2 − δ + 2kδ − (2 − δ + 2kδ) 2 − 8kδ 4 < 1 2 , reduces to 0 < 8kδ and − 4(1 − δ) < 0.
Both inequalities ara always satisfied. The Jacobian follows from evaluating the derivative at the fixed point. For the stability condition notice that the matrix is diagonal and the second eigenvalue, ν 2 ∈ (0, 1). In fact since δ < 1, k > 1 > 0.5 > λ * one has:
The value of the first eigenvalue, ν 1 , depends upon the value of λ * . This eigenvalue is the same as the linear coefficient of equation (11), that is, it is ν 1 < 1 given α ∈ (0, 1) and λ * ∈ (0, 1) and ν 1 > −1 as long as
Given the value of λ * one can check that the previous inequality is satisfied if and only if
.
Proof of Proposition 3
Recall from equation (29) in the previous proof that
We have already shown that ν 2 < 1. The lower bound, ν 2 > (1 − δ)(1 − 1/k), follows from the previous expression and λ * > 0 for all δ > 0 and for all α.
